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Abstract
This study’s objective is to compare cluster economies and diseconomies for mul-
tinational enterprises (MNEs) and uninational enterprises (UNEs) within the Lon-
don financial services cluster. In contrast to the implicit assumption of the cluster 
participation literature that the economies and diseconomies of clusters are valued 
similarly by all firms, we find that economies relating to social capital and labour 
market pooling are equally important to MNEs and UNEs, economies relating to 
local competition and diseconomies relating to congestion costs are more important 
to MNEs than to UNEs, and economies relating to the reputational effects of locat-
ing in a world-leading cluster and access to specialised suppliers are more important 
to UNEs than to MNEs. That MNEs and UNEs do not experience cluster econo-
mies and diseconomies in the same way indicates that both cluster participation the-
ory and international business theory need augmentation to recognise that cluster 
incumbents benefit and suffer from cluster membership differently.
Keywords Clusters · Location · FDI · MNEs · Uninational enterprises · Financial 
services
1 Introduction
The economies and diseconomies of industrial clustering have long been studied 
by economists and management scholars (Dunning 1998; Marshall 1890; Porter 
1998; Swann et al. 1998). Recently, two special issues on multinational enterprises 
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(MNEs) and location in geographical clusters, one in the Journal of Economic 
Geography in 2011 and the other in the Journal of International Business Studies 
in 2013, point to a surge and convergence of interest in the subject by economic 
geography (EG) and international business (IB) scholars. Within IB, a re-evaluation 
of the spatial organisation of MNE activities has been underway since Dunning’s 
(1998) call for more research on location, and in particular, location in clusters. 
He concluded: “The extent to which MNEs promote, or gravitate to, spatial clus-
ters within a country or region is an under-researched area” (Dunning 1998, p. 58). 
This is argued to be “[…] partly because scholars have believed that the principles 
underlying the locational decisions of firms within national boundaries can be eas-
ily extended to explain their cross-border locational preferences” (Dunning 1998, p. 
49). This belief is explored in this paper and, in particular, we ask: Do MNEs expe-
rience different economies and diseconomies of location within a cluster compared 
to uninational enterprises (UNEs)?
In order to address this question, this paper begins by assessing cluster economies 
and diseconomies in a highly productive industrial cluster—the City of London 
financial services cluster. The City of London is an exemplar cluster (Cook et  al. 
2007), albeit one embedded as a node in an international network of key financial 
centres (Amin and Thrift 1992). It is one of the few examples of a cluster which 
stands serious comparison with the iconic status of Silicon Valley. This financial 
services cluster supports nearly 2.2 million jobs across the UK, paying more in tax 
than any other sector and contributing 12% of UK GDP (TheCityUK 2016). It is the 
global leader in fixed income, currencies and commodities (FICC) trading, cross-
border lending, and specialty commercial insurance, and consistently occupies a top 
three position across other major business lines (The City UK 2016).
Following previous research (Nachum and Keeble 2003; Zaheer 1995; Zaheer and 
Mosakowski 1997), we adopt comparative analysis to investigate and identify those 
common and distinctive characteristics between MNEs and UNEs. Based on a data-
set drawing from a large-scale mail survey, our analysis shows that MNEs and UNEs 
do experience different economies and diseconomies of location within the financial 
services cluster in London. Specifically, we find that social capital and labour pool-
ing are equally important to MNEs and UNEs. However, local competition and con-
gestion costs are more important to MNEs, while the reputational benefit of locating 
in a strong cluster and access to specialised suppliers are more important to UNEs.
Our study’s main contribution is to add sophistication to the extant literature. 
Scholars of industrial clusters have long studied the economies and diseconomies 
of cluster participation for firms in general but have not distinguished the effects 
between MNEs and UNEs (Marshall 1890; Porter 1998; Swann and Prevezer 1996). 
In contrast to the implicit assumption of this literature, that economies and dise-
conomies of clusters are valued similarly by all firms, we provide a finer analysis to 
suggest that the economies and diseconomies of cluster participation are valued dif-
ferently by MNEs compared to UNEs.
In the next section, based on the established clusters literature and the emerging 
literature on MNEs in clusters, a set of hypotheses that relate to the research ques-
tion are generated. Then, the research design of the study is stated describing its 
unit of analysis and its method of data collection and analysis. Next, we present and 
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discuss the main results and additional results. The final section concludes and states 
the managerial and policy implications of the study.
2  Literature Review and Hypotheses
Clusters are defined as related firms based in a geographical area (Swann and 
Prevezer 1996). The geographical concentration of production is not a new phe-
nomenon, and dates back at least to Alfred Marshall who introduced the ‘industrial 
district’ concept describing the pattern of industrial organisation in late nineteenth 
century Britain in his Principles of Economics (Marshall 1890). Cluster participa-
tion is theorised as incumbents’ desire to access more effectively certain resources 
in industrial clusters by locating in geographic proximity (Enright 2000; Nachum 
and Keeble 2003; Porter 1998). A firm is said to participate in a cluster when it is 
located in geographic proximity to a collection of related firms and maintains vari-
ous forms of formal and informal linkages with them (Nachum and Keeble 2003).
The economies and diseconomies of cluster participation have attracted much 
interest among management scholars with notable representatives including Porter 
(1998), Swann et al. (1998), Dunning (1998), and the two special issues (Journal 
of Economic Geography in 2011 and Journal of International Business Studies in 
2013) on MNEs and location in geographical clusters. Drawing from this stream of 
literature, the specific economies and diseconomies of locating in a cluster from the 
perspective of the clustered firm are explained as follows.
Firms may be attracted to a location due to the existence of fixed factors (Swann 
et al. 1998). These are benefits that exist at a location that are not a function of the 
co-presence of related firms and institutions and include climate, time zone and lan-
guage. Beyond these fixed factors, we can distinguish between economies and dis-
economies of clustering. The former refer to increased benefits for incumbent firms 
as each additional firms joins the cluster. The latter refer to decreased benefits for 
incumbent firms as each additional firm joins the cluster. An additional firm join-
ing the cluster will drive both effects at the same time to differing degrees, which 
will turn both on the specific identity of the firm and the maturity of the cluster. Net 
economies give the extent to which economies outweigh diseconomies and so indi-
cate the strength of the cluster. Clusters then vary by strength according to the size 
of these net economies with rich, strong, high-performing clusters associated with 
large net economies and shallow, weak, low to average performing clusters associ-
ated with small or negative net economies. Economies and diseconomies can arise 
on both the demand and supply side.
On the demand side, the firm may benefit from customer proximity (Von Hippel 
1988) which can be especially important when customers are sophisticated. Such 
customers can encourage innovation through sophisticated demand and by alert-
ing suppliers of new trends and innovations. The clustered firm may also benefit 
from reduced customer search costs (Swann et al. 1998). The idea here is that the 
firm is more likely to be found by customers when it is located in a cluster. This 
is particularly important when customers have specific requirements. Information 
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externalities on the demand side may also exist, that is, a cluster’s reputation rubs 
off on the firm that is located in it (Kalnins and Chung 2004).
On the supply side, a major benefit is that knowledge spills over in a cluster 
and this is particularly important when valuable industry knowledge is tacit rather 
than codified. In a sense, tacit knowledge becomes a public good (Marshall 1890; 
McCann and Folta 2009). When this happens, innovation can be more prolific. 
Mechanisms for knowledge spillovers include labour market churn, social interac-
tion, spin-offs and diffusion via clients and suppliers. A second supply side ben-
efit is access to specialised inputs (Marshall 1890; McCann and Folta 2009). As a 
result, the firm benefits from lower search costs because it can easily recruit from a 
pool of specialised labour and can tap into a specialised supplier base. Infrastruc-
ture benefits (Porter 1998) go beyond access to a good transport network to include 
institutions that coordinate activities across companies in order to maximise collec-
tive productivity, for example, trade associations which set standards and/or conduct 
marketing for the cluster as a whole. Better motivation can also exist within a cluster 
as local rivalry can act as a powerful spur. Also, it can be easier to measure perfor-
mance (benchmark) against local rivals as they share a similar context leading to 
lower monitoring costs (Porter 1998). Another important supply side benefit is that 
it can be easier to try out new ideas in a cluster since it is possible to gain instant 
feedback and all of the inputs (including sympathetic venture capital) required for 
experimentation (Swann et al. 1998) are likely to be present in the cluster. Finally, 
a clustered firm may benefit from informational externalities on the supply side 
(Swann et al. 1998): The firm enjoys lower risk by observing successful production 
at a location.
With respect to cluster diseconomies, on the demand side, congestion and com-
petition in output markets (Swann et al. 1998) can lead to lower prices and so profits 
can fall. Also, a cluster specialised in a particular technology can go into decline if 
that technology is substituted.
On the supply side, congestion and competition in input markets can lead to 
higher wages and rents which in turn could lead to movement out of the cluster 
(Pandit et  al. 2002). This is a natural process and can be one whereby the cluster 
strengthens as those firms which can best take advantage of being in the cluster 
outbid others for factors of production. Three further decline factors can all tempt 
behaviour that erodes competitive advantage. Being close to competitors tempts 
cartel formation and isomorphism (herd behaviour) which can have a detrimental 
effect on innovation within the cluster (Porter 1990). A large labour pool tempts the 
formation of powerful trade unions which can stifle the cluster’s flexibility (Porter 
1998). Finally, a successful cluster can be taken for granted by local government 
resulting in stagnant local infrastructure (Swann et al. 1998).
Despite the large literature on the economies and diseconomies of industrial 
clustering, MNE participation in clusters has not received much attention and has 
tended to be a by-product when the focus is on other issues (Beugelsdijk et  al. 
2010). In order to review what is known from empirical research in this emerg-
ing area, we systematically trawled the following leading international business 
and economic geography journals: Journal of International Business Studies, 
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Environment and Planning A, Journal of World Business, Management Inter-
national Review, and Journal of International Management since 1998 when 
Dunning published his seminal paper ‘Location and multinational enterprise: a 
neglected factor?’. We found a total of seven empirical studies of MNE participa-
tion in clusters. From these, we located two further relevant studies published in 
other journals making a total of nine. These studies are summarised in Table 1 
and are used to inform the hypotheses that follow.
2.1  Testing the Implicit Assumption of the Cluster Participation Literature
Given the limited literature on MNE participation in clusters, all of the hypoth-
eses that follow are agnostic and derived from arguments in favour of both MNEs 
and UNEs. Empirical testing will then determine which, if any, are indeed agnos-
tic and which, if any, favour MNEs and which, if any, favour UNEs.
The clusters literature emphasises the importance of social capital that exists 
in clusters which relies on physical proximity for the building of trust and per-
sonal relationships and encourages mutual support (Hendry and Brown 2006). 
A higher degree of information sharing and cooperation can enhance not only 
innovation but also productive efficiency. Face-to-face contact is a classic advan-
tage of proximity, which allows not only trust to be built and maintained but also 
complex, tacit knowledge to be exchanged. The most common finding of the lit-
erature summarised in Table 1 on the motivation for MNE location in clusters is 
that MNEs locate in clusters to source tacit knowledge (Alcacer and Zhao 2012; 
Hervas-Oliver 2015; Jenkins and Tallman 2010; Mariotti et al. 2010). Three stud-
ies attempt to compare and contrast MNE motivation with non MNE motivation. 
Jenkins and Tallman (2010) and Manning et al. (2010) find that both MNEs and 
non MNEs (‘isolated firms’ in the case of the former; ‘local firms’ in the latter) 
benefit from and add to cluster knowledge. Similarly, Nachum and Keeble (2003) 
find that both ‘foreign’ and ‘indigenous’ firms benefit from social capital. MNEs 
and UNEs are likely to benefit similarly from a cluster’s social capital because 
MNEs have increasingly abandoned hierarchical organisational structures in 
favour of more decentralised organisational structures and have therefore adopted 
similar operations and organisational processes to UNEs (Nachum and Keeble 
2003; Rosenzweig and Singh 1991). This MNE organisational evolution results 
in greater autonomy for subsidiaries and drives changes in subsidiary activities 
(Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989; Birkinshaw and Hood 1998; Hennart 2009). Nachum 
(2003) supports this line of thinking by identifying the increased importance and 
autonomy of foreign subsidiaries. More autonomous subsidiaries tend to con-
trol a larger amount of the value chain and share responsibility for innovation 
and knowledge creation (Rugman and Verbeke 2001; Rugman et al. 2011). As a 
result, MNE subsidiaries are likely to be deeply embedded in local clusters and 
benefit from social capital to the same extent as local UNEs.
Hypothesis 1: In strong clusters, social capital will be equally important to MNEs 
and UNEs.
 N. R. Pandit et al.
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The second most common finding of the literature summarised in Table 1 on the 
motivation for MNE location in clusters is that MNEs locate in clusters because other 
MNEs have located there. This isomorphic behaviour is most acutely observed by 
Manning et al. (2010) and Mariotti et al. (2010). Amin and Thrift (1992) suggest that 
strategic sense-making and strategy formulation with references to peers is a powerful 
reason why MNEs locate in global cities. Furthermore, Knickerbocker (1973) argues 
that FDI in oligopolistic industries such as financial services is due to imitative behav-
iour and that such behaviour is a method of coping with uncertainty. MNEs find that 
the safest thing to do is to copy rivals and this benchmarking is easier when co-located 
within a cluster. Hence, a ‘bandwagon effect’ (Sethi et al. 2003) is observed. Support-
ing this reasoning, Manning et al. (2010) find that MNEs follow other MNEs when 
making location choices within clusters and Mariotti et al. (2010) find that MNE loca-
tion in clusters is subject to isomorphic tendencies. What is missing from this litera-
ture is a good argument for why UNEs would act differently from MNEs. Giachetti 
and Torrisi (2017) draw from neo-institutional theory and find that all types of firm 
imitate the market leader in highly uncertain environments. A cluster is such an envi-
ronment because therein competition tends to be innovation-based with technologies 
and practises changing rapidly and a cluster is where the market leader is most likely 
to reside. This finding holds for all firms in highly uncertain environments with no 
distinction between MNEs and UNEs or size or market share. Accordingly, we test:
Hypothesis 2:  In strong clusters, local competition will be equally important to 
MNEs and UNEs.
The clusters literature has long recognised that access to a skilled labour pool is a 
prime attraction to firms and central to the dynamics of clustering (Marshall 1890). 
Nachum and Keeble (2003) find that both ‘foreign’ and ‘indigenous’ firms benefit 
from labour pooling. Skilled labour in a cluster is highly valued by MNEs because 
a MNE can transfer, and so leverage, the knowledge embodied in that labour across 
different countries (Al Ariss et al. 2014). Also, whilst UNEs interface with their local 
business environment, MNEs additionally interface with business activities within the 
overall organisation across numerous locations making their overall environment more 
complex. It is possible that the more complex nature of MNE business activities mean 
that MNEs are better able than UNEs to extract potential value from skilled labour. 
Additional intra-firm knowledge flows places a premium on skilled labour that is bet-
ter able to understand and absorb knowledge transferred internally within the firm. As 
MNEs will on average also pay higher wages than UNEs, they are better placed to 
attract premium skilled labour. Overall, this should mean that MNEs will be able to 
exploit strategic resources such as skilled labour to a greater extent than UNEs. Tato-
glu et al. (2016) provide evidence that supports this line of thinking finding that MNEs 
employ more complex talent management systems than local firms.
Skilled labour is also highly valued by UNEs because it is one of the main avenues 
to access new tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge diffusion occurs via this labour mar-
ket mobility which increases with pool size. This is a reason why clusters, with their 
large labour market pools, are associated with high levels of innovation and produc-
tivity. This critical resource of skilled labour tends to be highly place-specific and so 
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is a source of abiding competitive advantage to UNEs located in the cluster (Taylor 
et al. 2003). As the skilled labour pool deepens, so workers are incentivised to invest in 
higher levels of specialised human capital. The most successful UNEs attract the best 
talented labour which can subsequently spin-off to create new successful UNEs that 
attract yet more talented labour.
Overall, we suggest that labour pooling is valued similarly by both MNEs and 
UNEs although perhaps for different reasons.
Hypothesis 3: In strong clusters, labour pooling will be equally important to MNEs 
and UNEs.
The reputational advantage of a clustered location is a neglected benefit in the 
clusters literature generally but is well understood by scholars of the City of London 
(Allen and Pryke 1994; Clark 2002; Taylor et  al. 2003). Being a City firm gives 
an assurance of quality to the customer, which overcomes an important information 
asymmetry regarding the true quality of what is essentially a credence good/service, 
whose quality is very hard to evaluate even after consumption. This is understand-
ably important for UNEs. Equally, it is understandably important for new or less 
well-known MNEs. However, it may also be important for well-known MNEs that 
already have a reputation, often stemming from their home country, where a clus-
ter’s reputational effect may complement and so enhance the MNEs country-of-ori-
gin effect (Vidaver-Cohen et al. 2015). To contribute to this debate, we test:
Hypothesis 4: In strong clusters, reputation will be equally important to MNEs and 
UNEs.
Access to specialised suppliers is one of the three classic Marshallian advan-
tages of a cluster location (Marshall 1890). As the cluster deepens, so a greater 
array of specialised suppliers emerge (Mudambi 2008). That this factor might be 
more important to UNEs than MNEs is reasonable, given that MNEs are apt to 
have greater resources, knowledge and capabilities in-house compared to UNEs, 
an idea going back to Hymer (1976) and a cornerstone of Dunning’s Eclectic Par-
adigm (Dunning 1979). However, recent research shows declining MNE owner-
ship of value chains with a greater tendency to rely on specialised suppliers rather 
than wholly-owned affiliates (Narula 2018). Focusing on service sector clustering, 
Nachum and Keeble (2003) concur, finding that both ‘foreign’ and ‘indigenous’ 
firms benefit from specialised suppliers. To contribute to this debate, we test:
Hypothesis 5: In strong clusters, access to specialised suppliers will be equally 
important to MNEs and UNEs.
From Table 1, we see that Manning et al. (2010) is the only empirical study to go 
beyond economies to consider diseconomies of clustering and find that cluster growth 
may lead to diseconomies. They find that MNEs are likely to be sensitive to some 
diseconomies of clusters (such as congestion costs and stagnant local infrastructure). 
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MNEs have comparative information from their dispersed operations because of their 
different global strategic postures. Also, they make location decisions frequently and 
are more likely to change location for particular activities if there is a cost advantage. 
On the other hand, UNEs have all their ‘eggs’ in one locational basket and so will 
acutely experience diseconomies of clusters and will be less able than MNEs to miti-
gate negative consequences by, for example, moving some activities out of the cluster 
(Cook et al. 2007). To inform this controversy, we test:
Hypothesis 6: In strong clusters, congestion will be equally important to MNEs and 
UNEs.
3  Research Design
The foregoing literature review and theoretical arguments suggest that there are rea-
sons to expect that there is similarity in terms of cluster economies and disecono-
mies between MNEs and UNEs. However, because of the unique characteristics of 
MNEs, the impact of cluster participation for MNEs may be different from that for 
UNEs. We attempt to examine our hypotheses by focusing on one important cluster 
in this study. This cluster, or unit of analysis, needed to have two characteristics: 
Firstly, it needed to be a strong cluster. Secondly, it needed to have a substantial 
MNE component. The unit of analysis chosen, that meets both of these criteria, is 
the City of London financial services cluster.
3.1  The City of London Financial Services Cluster
The financial services industry plays a vital intermediary role in the world economy, 
moving funds from entities with savings to those with capital requirements. Swann 
states “Probably the strongest cluster in the UK is the financial services cluster in the 
City of London” (Swann 2009, p. 151). Similarly, Dunning states “Perhaps the best 
illustration of a spatial cluster, or agglomeration, of related activities to minimise 
distance-related transaction-costs, and to exploit the external economies associated 
with the close presence of related firms is the Square Mile of the City of London” 
(Dunning 1998, p. 61). Although the City has historically referred to the ‘Square 
Mile’ around the Bank of England, developments to the east, west, and north have 
extended the centre to the extent that the term ‘the City’ is now used to refer to the 
cluster as a whole and not just the square mile (Kynaston 2001).
The City is best understood as a wholesale financial services centre with core 
activities in banking, insurance, and fund management supported by a panoply of 
activities including legal services, accounting, management consultancy, advertis-
ing, market research, recruitment, property management, financial printing and pub-
lishing, and the provision of electronic information. The City remains strong, despite 
the financial services downturn beginning in 2007. The cluster has maintained its 
leading global position in terms of exporting more financial services than any other 
country and hosting the highest number of FRPS (financial and related professional 
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services) headquarters (The City UK 2016). The financial services cluster in London 
is the global leader in FICC (Fixed Income, Currencies and Commodities) trading, 
cross-border lending and specialty commercial insurance, and consistently occupies 
a top three position across other major business lines (The City UK 2016).
London is also a leading FRPS cluster due to its network of interconnected busi-
nesses, suppliers, and associates. This ‘cluster effect’—which encompasses the full 
range of FRPS—provides the UK’s FRPS businesses with better efficiencies, pro-
ductivity, access to talent, and more rapid innovation than other international loca-
tions (The City UK 2016). The London financial services cluster supports nearly 2.2 
million jobs across the UK, paying more in tax than any other sector and contribut-
ing 12% of UK GDP (The City UK 2016).
What of the second criterion, the need for the cluster to have a substantial MNE 
component? The City’s current attractiveness as a centre for FDI and its position as 
the world’s most important international financial services cluster is the result of a 
number of significant developments in the post-war period, the most recent of which 
was deregulation in the 1980s which triggered a substantial rise in FDI in the City 
(Kynaston 2001). It was the first major deregulation of this type in Europe: “This 
focus on competitiveness meant that foreign investment was encouraged, resulting 
in most of the leading wholesale institutions being foreign owned” (HM Treasury 
2003, p. 31, emphasis added). Clark states:
“London is an ‘industrial district’ that has attracted and retained firms whose 
home location could place them elsewhere in the world (in the US and Europe 
for example). Indeed, for many such firms, locating and developing a signifi-
cant presence in London has been a conscious locational choice made both in 
relation to competitors and related firms, and in relation to the preferences and 
needs of UK and European customers” (2002, p. 438).
The globalisation of finance began to accelerate during the 1970s in terms of 
the growth of international banking and securities markets, the strengthening of the 
linkages between domestic banking and securities markets, and the deepening of 
these same domestic markets (Coleman 2014). In 2015, the UK attracted 94 inter-
national projects, accounting for one third of all financial services FDI in Europe, 
creating 8138 jobs (EY 2016).
3.2  Methods
The hypotheses were tested via a questionnaire (available from the authors on request) 
consisting of 40 cluster economy and diseconomy items. In almost all cases, respondents 
were asked to rank the importance of a potential economy (benefit) or diseconomy (cost) 
from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important) with an option of 0 if not applicable.
In order to ascertain the reach of cluster economies and diseconomies, a focus 
group study of senior financial services executives was conducted. This revealed 
that the appropriate area was up to 500 metres beyond the boundaries of the City of 
London and Canary Wharf. The focus group also advised which lines of activity to 
include within the questionnaire survey. The sample of financial services companies 
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(engaged in banking, investment banking, insurance, fund management, legal ser-
vices, accounting, management consultancy, advertising, market research, recruit-
ment, property management, financial printing and publishing, and the provision of 
electronic information) was drawn from this area from the Market Location data-
base. This UK database contains 2.3 million business records which detail contact 
names by job title, SIC and Market Sector codes, number of employees and loca-
tion status (branch, head office or sole office and precise location based on postal 
address). It was therefore well suited for our purpose. Because of the particular 
importance of large ‘hub’ or ‘universal’ firms in the City, we over-sampled these 
by including all of the largest 350 financial services firms within our geographical 
boundary. A further 1150 financial services firms were then drawn at random from 
the remaining population of 22,650 firms. Accordingly, a total of 1500 question-
naires were posted, addressed to the chief executive officer, by name when it was 
known. The study benefited from the support of a very senior and highly regarded 
public official connected to the UK financial services industry who agreed to add 
her endorsement in the questionnaire’s covering letter.
A total of 310 usable questionnaires were returned, a response rate of just over 
20%. Of these, 140 were UNEs and 170 were MNEs. We tested to see if our sample 
was representative. A Chi square analysis of the composition of the sample by 3 
digit SIC line of activity against the 1500 questionnaires sent showed no statistically 
significant difference between the two groups. The critical value of Chi square (7) at 
the 10% level is 12.017, the calculated Chi square for our test for non-response bias 
is 3.395 for the 1150 stratified random sample, 5.367 for the 350 largest firms, and 
5.457 for both groups combined. We are therefore confident that we have a random 
and representative sample of the population of interest. As a further check of non-
response bias, tests were conducted for any significant differences between early and 
late responders (those who responded before and after a reminder request was sent). 
Using a Chi square test based on a null hypothesis of no difference in composition 
by 3 digit SIC, the calculated Chi square was 2.991 compared to the 10% critical 
value of Chi square (6) of 10.645, showing insufficient evidence to reject the null. 
Two-sample t tests were conducted using firm size and the score on each of the six 
main factors used in the analysis. Only one test showed a significant difference, that 
for the score on the ‘local competition’ factor, which was just significant at the 10% 
level. In summary, there is scant evidence of non-response bias.
Two related analyses were performed on the data in order to address the study’s 
objectives. Firstly, an exploratory factor analysis was conducted to organise and 
reduce the cluster economy and diseconomy variables into factors (or latent vari-
ables). Secondly, the derived factors scores were entered into logit and multinomial 
logit analyses to identify factors which discriminate between MNEs and UNEs, 
pooling domestic and foreign MNEs into a single MNE category in the logit model 
and keeping them separate for additional more fine-grained analysis in the multino-
mial logit. Multinomial logit is the appropriate estimation method, rather than con-
ditional or mixed logit, since none of the variables represents an inherent property 
of the alternatives, UNE, domestic MNE or foreign MNE. We use the term foreign 
MNE rather than foreign subsidiary to reflect the fact that many foreign financial 
services MNEs are headquartered in the City (The City UK 2016). The City is 
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therefore more than a subsidiary location for these MNEs. The use of multinomial 
logit here differs from the standard case in economics, where the alternatives are 
choices made by an individual and the variables represent influences on that choice. 
Instead, the variables here should be thought of as discriminators between different 
alternatives. This is akin to the use of multinomial logit in medical statistics, where 
the variables would be symptoms which are possible discriminators between differ-
ent underlying pathologies (Long and Freese 2006).
Custom control and dummy variables were added to each model. Dummy vari-
ables were added for the principal line of activity, with banking being the default 
category and size was controlled for using numbers of employees, which resulted in 
the loss of 16 observations, and age, which resulted in a loss of a further 20 observa-
tions. Some analysis was performed using total assets as an alternative proxy for size, 
however this was not particularly informative, as it reduced the effective sample by a 
further 80 observations because some types of firm are not required to disclose such 
information. Total assets were never significant as a variable and their inclusion did 
not make a clear difference to the overall conclusions. Six variables were included in 
the initial analysis which identified how important a London location was in helping 
firms innovate through developing respectively: new products, new services, better 
ways of delivering products or services, developing new markets, improving organi-
sational structure, and re-orienting the company strategically. A set of dummies was 
also included which indicated whether or not the firm had received important or 
very important benefits from interaction with personnel in another local company in 
each of the following ways: meeting at local business events; contact by telephone 
for short term problem solving; contact by telephone for information; mixing with 
industry colleagues in social settings; chance meetings where interesting informa-
tion had been heard. A final set of dummies was included to capture (1) the extent of 
reliance on the South East as a source of labour (2) the proportion of work derived 
from contact with other firms in London; and (3) three variables were included to 
investigate how important informal channels of recruitment were for hiring senior 
management, senior staff and specialist staff. This reflects the hypothesised impor-
tance of personal contacts and reputation networks in recruitment of highly skilled 
knowledge workers. As explained below, the results presented are based on only a 
subset of these controls, following diagnostic checking.
The main reason for not estimating full structural equation models is that the pur-
pose of the second analysis was not to test hypothesised relationships between the 
latent variables that are estimated but rather to examine if there is a significant dif-
ference between MNEs and UNEs on certain latent variables. We follow a standard 
approach of exploratory factor analysis to measure latent variables. We preferred 
exploratory factor analysis over principal components analysis as our purpose was to 
use our manifest variables to measure underlying factors, which are consistent with 
factors favouring and disfavouring clusters identified in the literature. It was not to 
reduce our data to a smaller set of uncorrelated variables which is the rationale for 
principal components analysis (Blunch 2008). We did not have sufficiently strong 
theoretical priors to impose the typical restrictions required for confirmatory fac-
tor analysis, namely that each of our manifest variables was related to one and only 
1 3
The Economies and Diseconomies of Industrial Clustering:…
one factor or that particular parameter values could be imposed on the relationship 
between a particular factor and its manifest indicator.
Factor extraction was by principal axis factoring (Blunch 2008; Kim and Muel-
ler 1978). Highly similar results (not reported) were obtained using principal com-
ponents, therefore little hinges on this choice. The main method used to determine 
the number of factors to use was the scree plot (Cattell 1966), which indicated six 
factors at the point of inflection. According to Stevens (2002), the scree plot method 
is reliable provided there are over 200 observations. The scree plot is preferred to 
Kaiser’s criterion of retaining all factors with an eigenvalue greater than one as nei-
ther of the rules for Kaiser’s criterion being accurate are satisfied (Kaiser 1961): 
The average communality value is less than 0.6, even though there are less than 300 
observations.
The method of rotation used was varimax, which has the benefit of producing 
more interpretable groups of variables on each factor, important because the fac-
tors themselves are of independent interest in this analysis (Field 2009). In principle, 
there is a case for oblique rotation as there are theoretical grounds for suspecting the 
factors to be correlated with one another. Inspection of the correlation matrix for the 
factor scores revealed no serious correlation between scores on the factors in each 
analysis. Nevertheless, Oblimin rotation was run as a robustness check. The substan-
tive interpretation of the factors extracted was the same, although the factors them-
selves were not quite so distinct. For this reason, the results using Varimax rotation 
are reported. Nothing important hinges on this choice.
Stevens (2002) suggests that with at least 300 observations the relevant criterion 
is a factor loading of 0.364 or more. Based on this rule, factor loadings after rotation 
in excess of 0.37 are reported.
As stated above, initially 40 variables were entered. These sets of variables 
needed to be reduced as problems of multicollinearity were indicated by a determi-
nant of the R-matrices well below 0.00001. Variables were identified for removal 
based on an inspection of the anti-image correlation matrix. No items had small cor-
relations, all being above 0.6 and the vast majority being above 0.8, but off-diag-
onal elements were inspected to identify pairs of variables which had the largest 
correlations and/or correlation substantially greater than zero with several variables. 
Robustness analysis was conducted by deleting slightly different sets of variables 
where alternative borderline judgements were used. This did not materially affect the 
substantive conclusions regarding factor structures. We ended up with 24 variables.
Regarding the validity of the factor analyses, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure 
of sampling adequacy was very good at 0.846, indicating reliable factors would be 
extracted. The correlations in the anti-image matrix were all between 0.776 and 
0.918, indicating good sampling adequacy. Cronbach’s α was generally satisfactory 
with all values apart from factor 6 lying above the 0.7 threshold. The value of α in 
each case was not sensitive to deletion of items in each sub-scale. This indicates that 
the scales are reliably measured.
Our dependent variable was independently obtained, thus reducing the risk of 
common method bias (Chang et al. 2010). Also, it is highly unlikely that the assess-
ments of respondents would have been influenced by a working model of the rela-
tionship between status as MNE or UNE and the importance of particular sources 
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of cluster economy and diseconomy. Furthermore, in many cases the variables load-
ing onto a particular factor were not adjacent to one another in the questionnaire. 
Finally, our results are not degenerate, as would be indicated if all manifest variable 
load onto one big factor. We identify many distinct factors which make sense in rela-
tion to the existing literature. In summary, the results are unlikely to be seriously 
affected by common method bias.
We do not control for multiplant enterprises. This is because in many areas in 
financial services, there are branch offices (think of the major banks) and many of 
these will be small and of little strategic significance, so separately examining mul-
tiplant firms is not very meaningful in this sector in the way that it would be if we 
were dealing with manufacturing, where even a small production facility is a far big-
ger commitment than a branch of a bank or an insurance company. Two robustness 
checks were made. First, a dummy variable was added to indicate a multiplant UNE 
(MNEs are by definition multiplant). This was always well short of being significant. 
Second, multiplant UNEs were identified as a separate category in a multinomial 
logit analysis. In this case, the results were not significant and were uninformative.
Regarding the main results, we report results for MNEs as a whole and do not dis-
tinguish between foreign and domestic MNEs because our results show that, except 
for the composition of the domestic and foreign MNE samples by sub-sector, there 
are no strong differences between them regarding the clustering variables or the key 
controls. An auxiliary logit model, modelling the difference between domestic and 
foreign MNEs (not reported), but excluding the sub-sector dummies, was well short 
of significance (χ2(16) = 15.59, p = 0.4818). The auxiliary regression including the 
sub-sector dummies was significant at the 5% level.
4  Main Results
The factor loadings in Table 2 show how strongly each variable correlates with the 
factor onto which it loads. It is not unusual, nor a problem, if one variable loads onto 
more than one factor. We organise and reduce the cluster economy and diseconomy 
variables into six factors, namely social capital, local competition, congestion costs, 
labour pooling, reputation, and specialised suppliers.
We then enter derived factor scores into a main logit analysis to identify factors 
which discriminate between MNEs and UNEs and also a multinomial logit analysis 
for some auxiliary analysis to identify factors which discriminate between UNEs, 
domestic MNEs and foreign MNEs. The dependent variable in the logit model takes 
the value 0 for a UNE, and 1 for an MNE and in the multinomial logit model takes 
the value of 0 for a UNE, 1 for a domestic MNE, and 2 for a foreign MNE. The 
results do not show how important the factors are in absolute terms. Rather, they 
show similarities and differences in how they are evaluated by each firm type. In the 
logit model, a factor with a positive coefficient is more important for MNEs whilst a 
factor with a negative coefficient is more important UNEs. Statistical insignificance 
indicates that the factor is equally important for MNEs and UNEs. It does not neces-
sarily indicate that the variable is not important to either type of firm, merely that 
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they rate the importance of the variable in much the same way. Interpretation is not 
so straightforward in the multinomial logit and will be explained fully below.
Table 3 presents the main findings of the study from our logit analysis and shows 
the standard coefficients and the marginal effects, which are average marginal effects 
taken over all observations in the sample. The marginal effects give the change in 
the probability the firm is an MNE for a small change in the continuous variables 
and for the presence of a characteristic for the qualitative variables.
The results clearly support hypothesis 1. Social capital is statistically insig-
nificant. This suggests that this cluster factor has similar economies for MNEs and 
UNEs. The group of variables loading highly onto the social capital factor concern 
geographical proximity’s promotion of personal relationships, which is important to 
both MNEs and UNEs because a higher degree of information sharing and coopera-
tion, which can enhance not only innovation but also greater productive efficiency in 
the finance industry.
Regarding hypothesis 2, the coefficient on local competition is positive and sig-
nificant at the 5% level. This indicates that this cluster factor is more important to 
MNEs compared to UNEs, which supports the findings of Manning et  al. (2010), 
Mariotti et al. (2010) and the theoretical reasoning of Amin and Thrift (1992) and 
Knickerbocker (1973). It is notable that the spur of rivalry and the ability to bench-
mark load heavily onto local competition, supporting one of Porter’s (1990) lead-
ing contentions. The ability to access real time information is also highly important. 
There is also a link between local competition and the ability to take market share 
from rivals and this is redolent of Hotelling’s (1929) work which was the first to 
model the geographical dimension of competition. All of this is not to say that locat-
ing close to rivals is unimportant to UNEs. It is likely that they too benefit from the 
increased ability to imitate rivals and the market leader in particular, benefit from 
the spur of local rivalry, access real time information and the ability to take market 
share from rivals. What we find is that MNEs value these abilities significantly more 
than UNEs.
The results clearly support hypothesis 3. Labour pooling is statistically insignif-
icant. This indicates that this cluster factor has similar economies for MNEs and 
UNEs. The group of variables loading highly onto the labour pooling factor con-
cern labour pooling’s promotion of innovation, the spread of tacit knowledge and 
best practise and labour and the facilitation of easier recruitment which are equally 
important to both MNEs and UNEs in the finance industry. Whilst labour is mobile 
globally and the London labour market has global reach, the London labour market 
itself is immobile—people will come to the City, but not other locations even a short 
distance away.
Regarding hypothesis 4, the coefficient on reputation is negative and significant 
at the 5% level. This indicates that this cluster factor is more important to UNEs 
compared to MNEs. Reputation centres on information externalities on the demand 
side whereby the cluster’s reputation rubs off on firms that are located in it. As we 
have argued, this is a neglected benefit in the clusters literature generally but is 
well understood by scholars of the City of London (Allen and Pryke 1994; Clark 
2002; Taylor et al. 2003). For example, Allen and Pryke find that “[…] in the case 
of finance, the abstract space of the City of London has secured its dominance over 
 N. R. Pandit et al.
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time through its ability continually to mould the space around it in its own image. 
The City is finance […]” (Allen and Pryke 1994, p. 459). Similarly, on the basis of 
extensive interview evidence, Clark finds that “[…] a firm’s reputation may depend 
upon the reputation of its financial centre as much as its own competence” (Clark 
2002, p. 440). UNEs will be less prominent than MNEs and so may benefit dis-
proportionately from a cluster’s reputation as a means for overcoming an important 
information asymmetry regarding the true quality of their product.
Regarding hypothesis 5, the coefficient on specialised suppliers is negative and 
significant at the 10% level. This indicates that this cluster factor is more important 
to UNEs compared to MNEs. Specialised suppliers in the City of London include 
the professional body The City UK, educational institutions such as London Busi-
ness School and the Financial Times newspaper. That access to these specialist sup-
pliers is more important to UNEs than MNEs is reasonable as MNEs, with their 
greater resources, are more likely to produce industry information and offer in-house 
professional development programmes compared to UNEs.
Regarding hypothesis 6, the coefficient on congestion costs is positive and sig-
nificant at the 10% level. This indicates that this cluster factor is more important to 
MNEs compared to UNEs, which supports the argument that MNEs are likely to 
be particularly sensitive to congestion costs compared to UNEs because they have 
comparative information from their dispersed operations. Also, they make location 
decisions more frequently than the typical UNE and are, arguably, more likely to 
change location for particular activities if there is a cost advantage. Figure 1 depicts 
the main findings of the study.
Some robustness testing was done by re-estimating the model for firms above 
median size (20 employees). The results were broadly similar, however the esti-
mates were not precise, due to the high attrition among the UNEs, where only 25 
firms remained, confounding the comparison. Two of the cluster variables switched 
sign, reputation and access to specialised suppliers, but were a long way from being 
Cluster Economies and 
Diseconomies
More Important to MNEs Equally Important to
MNEs and UNEs
More Important to UNEs
• Local Competition
• Congestion Costs
• Social Capital
• Labour Pooling
• Reputation
• Specialised Suppliers
Fig. 1  Cluster economies and diseconomies
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significant. This is unlikely to be due to a pure size effect. A further auxiliary regres-
sion was run adding total assets to the model to control for size as well as numbers 
of employees and the coefficients on reputation and access to specialised suppliers 
remained negative and significant.
4.1  Additional Results
Table  4 shows factor means and means for age, total assets and employees for 
UNEs and MNEs, split between domestic and foreign and combined. It also shows 
the results of a standard t test of equality of means between UNEs and MNEs. A 
series of Scheffé tests of all pairwise comparison of means between UNEs, domestic 
MNEs, and foreign MNEs (not reported for brevity) revealed no significant differ-
ence between domestic and foreign MNEs on any variable in Table 4. Multinomial 
logit results, also show that it is data admissible to combine domestic and foreign 
MNEs, but not to combine either type of MNE with UNEs. It is plausible that liabil-
ity of foreignness (Zaheer 1995) is less significant in our sample than it is generally. 
The literature suggests that liability of foreignness is apt to be less serious in a cos-
mopolitan world city like London (Castells 2000; Friedmann 1986; Hall 1966; Sas-
sen 1991). Also financial services firms are highly globalised and do not suffer the 
liability of foreign to the extent suggested by the theory (Nachum 2003). To be sure, 
we ran a multinomial logit with UNE/domestic MNE/foreign MNE as categories 
and the results were qualitatively similar to the model we report and were very simi-
lar between the two types of MNEs. We have also conducted an analysis to make 
sure that the MNE effect is different from a size effect. Given that MNEs are larger 
than UNEs on average, we may expect the MNE effect may due to a size effect. This 
is not the case as we repeated the analysis only for large firms and the basic pattern 
of difference remained.
Table 4 shows that MNEs are significantly older than UNEs. They are also almost 
significantly larger than UNEs (the test for total assets is just outside conventional 
significance, but this test has fewer degrees of freedom, as there were gaps in the data 
on total assets). MNEs put significantly more emphasis on labour pooling and bench-
marking against competition which would be expected given their strategic incentives 
for choosing to locate in a particular place. They are also significantly more sensitive, 
as expected, to congestion costs. UNEs place significantly more emphasis on the rep-
utational benefits of locating in the City. As will be seen in the multivariate analysis, 
the significance of labour pooling disappears, whereas there is evidence that access to 
specialised suppliers is significantly more important to UNEs.
There were some differences in the preponderance of each type of firm in the var-
ious sub-sectors included in the data set. These were Banking, Insurance, Account-
ing, Legal, Management Consultancy and ‘Other’. Standard Chi square tests of asso-
ciation were carried out, in each case testing the null hypothesis that UNEs, domestic 
MNEs and Foreign MNEs were equally likely to be present in each sub-sector. In 
the main, this null was not rejected, however there were some exceptions. Foreign 
MNEs were significantly over-represented in the Banking sub-sector (χ2(2) = 39.80, 
p = 0.000). This difference remained highly significant when just comparing foreign 
 N. R. Pandit et al.
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and domestic MNEs (χ2(2) = 18.76, p = 0.000). This makes sense as there was a 
significant wave of entry of foreign banks into the City following deregulation in 
1986. In addition, many central banks of foreign countries have outposts in the City. 
Foreign MNEs are significantly under-represented in Legal (χ2(2) = 9.75, p = 0.008). 
This difference remained highly significant when comparing domestic and foreign 
MNEs (χ2(2) = 9.49, p = 0.002). This also makes sense given the very specific char-
acteristics of national legal systems, which creates an institutional barrier to entry. 
Foreign MNEs were also underrepresented in Fund Management, although this was 
only weakly significant (χ2(2) = 5.63, p = 0.06). The multinomial results that follow 
confirm that the principal difference in sub-sector composition is being driven by 
the foreign MNEs.
A series of Scheffé tests of comparison of means of Age, Total Assets, Employ-
ees, Social Capital, Competition, Congestion, Labour Pooling, Reputation and Spe-
cialised Suppliers were conducted, comparing across the different sub-sectors. There 
were no significant differences between any pair of sub-sectors at the 5% level. 
This is accounted for, in part, by relatively low degrees of freedom when break-
ing the data set down into its components. This provides some reassurance that the 
cluster effects reported in Sect. 4 are not being driven by differences in sub-sector 
composition.
Regarding Table  5, UNEs are the base outcome, against which the other two 
categories are compared. Unlike the logit model, the coefficients are not of central 
interest, however it can be noted that a positive coefficient indicates that a firm is 
more likely to be a domestic MNE than a UNE in the domestic MNE column and 
likewise, more likely to be a foreign MNE than a UNE in the foreign MNE column. 
The converse is true for a negative coefficient, which in both cases indicates that the 
variable is more likely to be associated with a UNE. What the coefficients do not 
show is whether an increase in a continuous variable, or the presence of a particular 
characteristic, is more likely to indicate the firm is a UNE, a domestic MNE or a 
foreign MNE, as they are based only on two-way, not three-way comparisons. The 
marginal effects, reported in Table 6, show the change in probability that a firm is a 
UNE, domestic MNE or foreign MNE. Here a negative coefficient indicates a lower 
probability that the firm will belong to the particular category indicated by the col-
umn and vice versa for a positive coefficient.
Tables 5 and 6 reveal some interesting auxiliary results. Starting with Table 5, 
and taking the domestic MNE category first, labour pooling and social capital are 
well short of conventional significance and as such do not influence the probability 
the firm is a domestic MNE, as opposed to being a UNE. Accordingly, these two 
factors, whilst they are important to both domestic MNEs and UNEs in an abso-
lute sense, do not discriminate between them, so are equally important to each type 
of firm. Greater concern about congestion costs raises the probability the firm is a 
domestic MNE rather than a UNE and the effect is significant. Greater importance 
on the benefit of being able to benchmark against competition also raises the prob-
ability the firm is a domestic MNE and this effect is just outside conventional sig-
nificance (p = 0.11). Greater importance placed on access to specialised suppliers 
lowers the probability the firm is a domestic MNE, as opposed to being a UNE and 
the effect is significant. Greater importance placed on reputational effects of locating 
 N. R. Pandit et al.
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in the cluster also lowers the probability the firm is a domestic MNE and this effect 
is just outside conventional significance (p = 0.13). Size, measured by employment, 
is strongly significant and increases the probability a firm is an MNE, consistent 
with the strongly significant different in mean size between the two types of firm. 
Recruiting a smaller percentage of staff from the South East significantly increases 
the probability the firm is a domestic MNE.
A very similar pattern is evident when foreign MNEs are compared to being a 
UNE (which remains the base category). Social capital and labour pooling are far 
from significance. A greater importance placed on benchmarking against competi-
tion and on congestion costs raises the probability the firm is a foreign MNE, as 
opposed to being a UNE (p = 0.11 for the congestion costs). A greater importance 
placed on gaining reputational effects and access to specialised suppliers lowers 
the probability the firm is a foreign MNE. Size is strongly significant and posi-
tively associated with being a foreign MNE. Recruiting a high proportion of staff 
from the South East is significant and decreases the probability the firm is a for-
eign MNE. What stands out in the foreign MNE comparison is that the sub-sec-
tor dummies are all strongly significant and being in any sector other than banking 
decreases the probability the firm is a foreign MNE, whereas sub-sector is not a 
significant discriminator when comparing UNEs and domestic MNEs. This makes 
sense. The industrial composition of the UNEs and domestic MNEs will reflect the 
natural endowments and institutions of the home country. The strongest firms will 
become MNEs. There is a well know sub-sector bias in which firms become MNEs 
(Caves 1996) and this shows up more in the composition of the foreign MNEs and 
is driven by those sub-sectors which (a) are more predisposed to become MNEs and 
(b) which would find London an especially favourable location at the sub-national 
scale. This means the make-up of sub-sectors in the foreign MNE sample will be 
more specific than for the domestic firms. What the results show is that this sub-
sector bias is overwhelmingly in banking.
Table  6 shows the average marginal effects of the variables on the probability 
that a firm will belong to a particular one of the three categories, UNE, domestic 
MNE or foreign MNE. Thus, belonging to insurance raises the probability that a 
firm is a UNE by 0.2166, raises the probability that a firm is a domestic MNE by 
0.189 and lowers the probability that a firm is a foreign MNE by 0.4056. The sum 
of these marginal effects is 0, as the firm must belong to one of the three catego-
ries. The results are consistent with the two-way comparisons: The industrial com-
position of the foreign MNEs is significantly different to domestic firms, both UNEs 
and MNEs. As before, social capital and labour pooling are not significant. Local 
competition and congestion are negatively and significantly associated with being a 
UNE. There is no significant difference between the effect of these factors on being 
either a domestic or a foreign MNE, but, as will be shown below, these factors do 
have a significant positive effect on the probability of being an MNE when domestic 
and foreign are pooled. Separating the two simply dilutes the effect on the probabil-
ity. Access to specialised suppliers makes it significantly more likely the firm is a 
UNE and the reputation factor is also positively and significantly associated with the 
probability of being a UNE.
 N. R. Pandit et al.
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As Table 7 shows, the Wald test of the admissibility of combining categories is 
not rejected for the categories of domestic and foreign MNEs, which supports our 
use of the bivariate logit comparing just MNEs as a single category with UNEs. The 
multinomial logit relies on the assumption that the errors in the underlying model 
determining which category the firm is most likely to fall into are independent. 
This is commonly known as the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption, 
although we are not in the standard random utility framework in the current case 
and there is no behavioural assumption in question, as there would be in a choice-
theoretic context. The Hausman test is satisfied in this case, with χ2(23) = 21.85, 
p = 0.530 for the omission of the domestic MNE category and χ2(23) = 20.08, 
p = 0.637 for the omission of the foreign MNE category.
5  Conclusion
This study has sought to compare the economies and diseconomies of clusters for 
MNEs and UNEs. We find that some are similarly valued by MNEs and UNEs, some 
are valued more by MNEs, and some are valued more by UNEs. The results test 
our hypotheses. Economies relating to social capital and labour market pooling are 
equally important to MNEs and UNEs. Economies relating to local competition and 
diseconomies relating to congestion costs are more important to MNEs than to UNEs. 
Economies relating to the reputational effects of locating in a world-leading cluster 
and access to specialised suppliers are more important to UNEs than to MNEs.
That MNEs and UNEs do not experience all cluster economies and diseconomies 
the same way indicates that general cluster participation theory needs augmentation 
to recognise that cluster incumbents benefit and suffer from cluster membership dif-
ferently. This chimes with the increasingly influential Resource-Based View (RBV) 
of the firm which emphasises firm heterogeneity (Barney 1991; Teece et al. 1997; 
Wernerfelt 1984). From this perspective, we would expect different firms to value 
cluster economies and experience cluster diseconomies differently depending on 
how the economy or diseconomy enhances its resource strength, mitigates resource 
weakness, or is overcome by resource strength. Moreover, they will differ in their 
ability to take advantages of the cluster externalities which are available.
The results also support Dunning’s (1998) unease with the implicit conjecture on 
which so much IB research has been based. It seems that the principles underlying 
the locational decisions of firms within national boundaries are different to the prin-
ciples underlying the locational decisions of firms across national boundaries. The 
fact that MNEs and UNEs do not experience all cluster economies and disecono-
mies the same way therefore suggests that existing IB theory needs augmentation 
and this study is a step towards that.
Table 7  Wald test of the null 
hypothesis categories can be 
combined
Χ2(22) P value
Domestic MNE and foreign MNE 26.17 0.245
Domestic MNE and UNE 46.02 0.002
Foreign MNE and UNE 58.23 0.000
1 3
The Economies and Diseconomies of Industrial Clustering:…
Our findings have managerial and policy implications. First, the City of London’s 
claim to be the world’s leading international financial centre is supported, as both 
MNEs and UNEs are reported to benefit similarly from cluster participation with 
respect to social capital and labour pooling. Furthermore, local competition is found 
to be important for MNEs, and reputation gained from participating in the cluster 
and access to specialised suppliers are found to be important for UNEs. These are 
compelling attractors that justify the high cost of a London location and contribute 
to the cluster’s global recognition as the home for expertise and innovation. Second, 
our findings show that MNEs are more sensitive to congestion costs even in one of 
the most developed and globalised cities—London. In our survey, congestion costs 
such as disadvantages in national and international transportation, poor infrastruc-
ture and problematic government regulation in London are more important to MNEs 
compared to UNEs. With the UK’s planned exit from the EU, getting the response 
right to meet these challenges is essential to maintain the global strength of the finan-
cial services cluster in the City of London. Policymakers and regulators should bring 
forward policies that promote greater investment in environmental quality, modern 
buildings, and digital as well as national and international transport infrastructure.
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